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Mr. William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Casey:

I am enclosing for your review an article by David North that appeared in Aviation Week & Space Technology on March 17, 1986. The article alleges that the Defense Department and the CIA are implementing a disinformation campaign with respect to certain weapon systems and U.S. technology. I am concerned about these allegations, particularly as they relate to use of the American press and Congressional hearings to spread disinformation, and I would appreciate your responding to the article.

Among other things, the article states that the "Defense Dept., in conjunction with the Central Intelligence Agency, has initiated a disinformation program . . . to impede the transfer of accurate technological information to the Soviet Union." It adds that the decision "to pursue the coordinated use of disinformation by a number of government agencies was made more than two years ago, . . . covers 15-20 programs, six or seven of which are Defense Dept. projects," and may be extended to cover all operational levels within the Defense Department. The CIA is described as "a chief coordinator for the release through various channels of deliberately false, incomplete and misleading information."

I recognize that the United States has an interest in protecting sensitive information. There is no question that such information should be classified. There may also be circumstances when it is appropriate to provide false or misleading information to our adversaries through foreign sources (e.g., double agents).

However, the article suggests that the Department and the Agency may be providing false or misleading information to our own press and congressional committees. It quotes one unnamed Defense Department official as follows:

"If some of the results of the disinformation activity on a particular program get passed to Congress through hearings or other means, there are channels on the Hill that can be used to get the correct information to the people who need to know."

It adds that a six-inch thick document has been circulated within the Department that includes "a request for comments on the use of false

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requests for proposals, false or misleading information to be given at press interviews, inaccurate performance figures for aircraft and weapon systems, and other altered technical information."

I believe that providing false or misleading information to the American press or congressional committees could undermine the faith of the American people and press in the credibility of our government, something which is fundamental in a democracy such as ours. An open society does have more difficulty in protecting sensitive information than a closed society, but risking the confidence of our people in their government by disseminating false or misleading information in our nation could be very damaging.

For these reasons, I believe it is imperative for you to respond fully and accurately to the allegations made in this article. If these allegations are false, it would also seem appropriate for the Defense Department and the CIA to make that clear publicly, perhaps in a letter to the editor of Aviation Week and Space Technology.

I look forward to your early response.

With best regards.

Sincerely,



Matthew F. McHugh

MFH:gb
Enclosure

U. S. Using Disinformation Policy To Impede Technical Data Flow

By David M. North

Washington—The Defense Dept., in conjunction with the Central Intelligence Agency, has initiated a disinformation program that it is applying to a number of its aircraft and weapons development projects to impede the transfer of accurate technological information to the Soviet Union.

The policy decision to pursue the coordinated use of disinformation by a number of government agencies was made more than two years ago, according to officials involved in the program.

The CIA is a chief coordinator for the release through various channels of deliberately false, incomplete and misleading information. The disinformation effort covers 15-20 programs, six or seven of which are Defense Dept. projects.

Programs likely to be covered by the Defense Dept.'s disinformation policy include the Air Force's special mission aircraft flying in Nevada, the Air Force's Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB), the Navy's Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) and the Strategic Defense Initiative, one government official said.

Counterintelligence Benefit

"There has been discussion on establishing a disinformation, or counterintelligence, program of deception for years," another government official said. "It was not until recently that, after watching the Soviet Union practice this philosophy for years, the U.S. decided it would benefit by creating a similar program."

"Basically, you provide the Soviet Union with false or partly true data that prompts them to make decisions on wrong perceptions. The active part of the disinformation program has been going on for a time, but it has not been until very recently that there has been an increased emphasis on this type of approach to program management."

An outline for Defense Dept. disinformation activities involving all operational levels recently was circulated among many of the armed services' program offices and departments, signaling an increased emphasis on the active use of disinformation.

According to one government official, the 6-in.-thick document includes a request for comments on the use of false requests for proposals, false or misleading information to be given at press interviews, inaccurate performance figures for aircraft and weapon systems, and other altered technical information.

The extent of disinformation envisioned by some Defense Dept. officials, and already in place in some military programs, could cover the spectrum of weapon system development. This disinformation application would include documents needed to initiate a specific project, such as a program objective memorandum. Disinformation would then be applied to the development schedule, prototype performance, testing results, production schedules and operational achievements.


"Disinformation can be injected at every stage of a weapon program from documentation and the test envelope, to the actual operation of the system," a Defense

Dept. official said. "The range of deception can apply from the release of some inaccurate performance data and program milestones to the creation of a weapon system that does not exist with funds appropriated for the system being spent somewhere else."

"The most dangerous technique in supplying deliberately false information is a mixture of truth and fiction," he said. "This gives the Soviets a lot more to worry about."

"The most difficult decision in carrying out disinformation activity of this type is to determine what to convey and why. An active disinformation policy can cover in

Korean Air Force Accepts F-16D Fighter



General Dynamics F-16D multimission fighter for the Republic of Korea Air Force is shown in test flight near the company's plant in Ft. Worth, Tex., prior to acceptance by Korean officials. The dual-seat F-16D is the first of the latest model F-16 to go to an allied nation. The U. S. Air Force began receiving F-16C/D models last year. The F-16C/D aircraft feature improved radar, expanded-capacity fire control computers, greater structural strength for higher weapons loads and wiring provisions for advanced weapons now under development. Single-seat F-16 aircraft are to be delivered later to Korea, which has ordered 36 F-16s to date.

Stuck Wing Forces No. 2 B-1B to Land At High Speed

ternational, national, strategic, regional and tactical deceptions.

"The Soviet deception strategy covers most of these elements," he said. "The ones undertaken by the Defense Dept. are more involved with regional considerations covering an overall battle plan and are tactical in nature, rather than strategic."

Defense Dept. funding for disinformation activity is not large, the official said. Most of the funds required to generate overt false information have come from individual program budgets. The official also said that following traditional intelligence practice in compartmenting responsibility and chain of command, no single person is in charge of disinformation activity at the Defense Dept., although a number of top government officials are aware that deception is being used in some of their programs.

The oversight of the disinformation process at the Defense Dept. is the responsibility of a number of advisory groups, he said.

Correct Channels

"If some of the results of the disinformation activity on a particular program get passed to Congress through hearings or other means, there are channels on the Hill that can be used to get the correct information to the people who need to know," the official said. "Program budget amounts sent to Congress are correct."

Roy Godson, an associate professor of government at Georgetown University and a government consultant, believes there are benefits to be derived from making disinformation a matter of national policy, but he thinks that it will be difficult to implement fully in the U.S.

The establishment of a tactical disinformation program is more feasible than a strategic program, Godson said. There are numerous factors that work against a long-term deception program by the U.S. government, Godson said. The first is that the U.S. democratic political system does not lend itself to making long-term national security policy choices. Another negative factor in establishing this type of program, he said, is that by its very nature it knowingly misleads the American people, a dangerous precedent.

Another obstacle in implementing a disinformation program as envisioned by the Defense Dept. is that too many people would have to be aware that false or misleading information is being transmitted.

"This type of an operation would have to be a tightly held secret and we're in a

very information-porous system," Godson said. "It is not like the Soviet Union, where all major government entities are involved in this technique to help achieve Soviet objectives."

✓ "By saying that we have a disinformation policy aimed at the Soviet Union," Godson said, "maybe we are creating disinformation."

Another view of the disinformation activity was offered by a special adviser to the Defense Dept. on similar matters.

"The Soviet policy makers exploit our willingness to listen to all opinions, and in very few instances do the Soviet people hear the actual policies of the United States and its allies," the adviser said. "The Soviets have used active deceptions in an attempt to change policies in numerous instances, including the placement of cruise missiles in Europe and attempts to discredit our alliances with other nations."

"Our embarking on disinformation activity raises many difficult and emotional problems, that still need to be overcome. But we need to do it." □

Ariane Launch Postponed

Washington—An anomaly discovered in telemetry data from the European Ariane V16 vehicle launched last month from Kourou, French Guiana, has caused postponement of the V17 mission until completion of a technical review, expected by Mar. 17.

By early last week, analysis of V16 data had progressed to nozzle-vector actuators on the Ariane 1 Viking first-stage engines, which are built by Aerospatiale and Societe Europeenne de Propulsion (SEP) of France.

The Feb. 22 launch of the Spot-1 Earth resources satellite and Sweden's Viking scientific satellite was the last flight for the basic Ariane 1 (AWST Mar. 3, p. 21).

Actuator on the second of four first-stage engines showed a reading 8% above nominal pressure for the first 30 sec. of the flight. It then returned to normal, according to Philippe P. Rasse, director of engineering at Arianespace, Inc. Engineers at Societe Anonyme Belge de Constructions Aeronautiques (Sabca) of Belgium, SEP's actuator subcontractor, were attempting to reproduce the anomaly late last week and determine its cause.

The V17 launch of GStar 2 and Brasilsat S2 communications satellites on an Ariane 3 vehicle previously was scheduled for Mar. 14 and now is expected on Mar. 19 from the new ELA-2 site at Kourou.

Los Angeles—Air Force pilots completed a successful high-speed landing of the second production U.S. Air Force/Rockwell International B-1B bomber at Edwards AFB, Calif., last week after the aircraft's variable-sweep wings became stuck in a swept position during a training flight. The pilots also landed the bomber with only three of four engines operating after shutting down the aircraft's No. 3 engine as a precautionary measure after receiving a warning light indication in the cockpit.

The No. 2 B-1B was on a local training flight out of its home base at Dyess AFB, Tex., when the wing became stuck at the 55-deg. sweep position. Air Force officials decided to fly the B-1B to Edwards to take advantage of the base's 15,000-ft. main runway and lakebed runway extension area if needed for the high-speed landing.

238-Kt. Landing

Air Force Maj. David Holmes, instructor pilot and pilot Maj. Bill Fier brought the aircraft down on Edwards runway 04 at approximately 238 kt. indicated airspeed and began applying the brakes at 239 kt. The aircraft used up 13,000 ft. of runway during the rollout after landing a little beyond the threshold. The pilots turned the B-1B off onto the taxiway where a fire truck met the aircraft and extinguished a small brake fire.

A 20-member investigation and maintenance team was flown from Dyess to Edwards following the landing to begin an analysis of the incident. Preliminary reports indicate that the aircraft sustained limited damage to the brakes and tires as a result of the landing. A preliminary inspection of the General Electric F101-GE-102 turbofan that was shut down did not reveal any engine problems.

The investigation team was able to duplicate the wing sweep failure by hydraulically cycling the wings during ground tests, but the actual cause had not been identified as of late last week, according to the Air Force. Neither the flight test aircraft at Edwards or early production aircraft at Dyess were grounded as a result of the mishap.

Five crewmembers were on board the normally four-seat B-1B for the training flight. The extra crewmember, Maj. Dean Hodgson, an avionics systems instructor, was seated in a jump seat. The other crewmembers included Maj. Jim LaSalvia, offensive systems operator, and Capt. Fred Strain, defensive systems operator. None were injured during the landing.

The crew had just completed a